William A.J. Higgs PhD
Law for Biomedical Engineers – a snapshot of liability issues USYD 2020This is a presentation I delivered to the undergraduate biomedical engineers are Sydney University. The topic of the presentation is the ‘Law for Biomedical Engineers – a snapshot of liability issues’ and it summarises the scope of liability of biomedical engineers in practice.
As the policy is a commercial contract, the Court should, in construing it, “ask what a reasonable businessperson would have understood [the relevant] terms to mean”: Electricity Generation Corporation t/as Verve Energy v Woodside Energy Ltd (2014) 251 CLR 640; [2014] HCA 7 (Electricity Generation) at [35].
The task is an objective one; it involves identifying the imputed intention of the parties, by reference to the contractual text construed in the light of its context and purpose: Electricity Generation at [35]; Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 104; [2015] HCA 37 (Mount Bruce) at [46]-[51] and [108]-[109]; Victoria v Tatts Group Ltd [2016] HCA 5; (2016) 90 ALJR 392 at [51]-[75]; Simic v New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation (2016) 260 CLR 85; [2016] HCA 47; (2016) 91 ALJR 108 at [18].
Importantly, in their joint judgment in Mount Bruce, French CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ said (at [48]) that: Ordinarily, this process of construction is possible by reference to the contract alone. Indeed, if an expression in a contract is unambiguous or susceptible of only one meaning, evidence of surrounding circumstances (events, circumstances and things external to the contract) cannot be adduced to contradict its plain meaning. (Footnote omitted)
Their Honours also emphasised that “context” may be discerned from the entire text of the contract in question: at [46].
The applicable principles are as follows:
There was also no issue about the principles which govern the resolution of what lies in issue as to the proper construction of the endorsement to this insurance policy.
Where an insurance company prepares the document, it is bound to make its meaning as clear as possible: Craine v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 305; [1920] HCA 64. “A policy of insurance, even one required by statute, is a commercial contract and should be given a businesslike interpretation. Interpreting a commercial document requires attention to the language used by the parties, the commercial circumstances which the document addresses, and the objects which it is intended to secure”: McCann v Switzerland Insurance Australia Ltd (2000) 203 CLR 579; [2000] HCA 65 at [22].
The meaning of commercial documents must be determined objectively, their construction being determined by what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have understood them to mean, which requires consideration both of the text of the documents and also the surrounding circumstances: Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas (2004) 218 CLR 451; [2004] HCA 35 at [22].
If there is ambiguity, resort can also be had to the surrounding circumstances known to the parties: Codelfa Construction Pty Limited v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337 at 352; [1982] HCA 24.
The interpretation of an exclusion clause “is to be determined by construing the clause according to its natural and ordinary meaning, read in the light of the contract as a whole, thereby giving due weight to the context in which the clause appears including the nature and object of the contract, and, where appropriate, construing the clause contra proferentem in case of ambiguity.”: Darlington Futures Ltd v Delco Australia Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 500 at 510 [1986] HCA 82.
Where two meanings are open, “it is proper to adopt that meaning that will avoid consequences that appear irrational and unjust”: Public Transport Commission of New South Wales v J Murray-More (NSW) Pty Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 336 at 350; [1975] HCA 28. Further, in the event of ambiguity it is proper to give a construction “that would avoid irrational consequences that it is unlikely that the parties intended”: Distillers Co Bio-chemicals (Australia) Pty Ltd v Ajax Insurance Co Ltd (1974) 130 CLR 1 at 11; [1974] HCA 3.
A court may also depart from the “strictly literal meaning of a particular expression to place upon it an alternative construction which is more reasonable and more in accord with the probable intention of the parties if the words will bear that construction.”: Australian Casualty Co Ltd v Federico (1986) 160 CLR 513 at 520; [1986] HCA 32.
The contra proferentem rule is one of last resort, however, applying only when ambiguity remains after all other avenues of construction have been exhausted: Beefeater Sales International Pty Ltd v MIS Funding No 1 Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 217.
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