What is a securitisation swap?

A securitisation swap is a derivative contract that is typically used in the context of securitisation transactions to hedge or manage risks related to the underlying asset pool or the structured financing involved in the securitisation process. It allows the parties involved in the securitisation (such as the issuer, the arranger, or investors) to mitigate certain types of risks, such as interest rate risk, credit risk, or currency risk, associated with the securitised assets or liabilities.


Securitisation swaps can take various forms depending on the specific needs of the transaction, but they generally fall into two broad categories: interest rate swaps and credit default swaps. Here’s an overview of these types of swaps in the context of securitisation:

Interest Rate Swap in Securitisation
Purpose: One of the most common types of swaps used in securitisation transactions is an interest rate swap. This is typically used to hedge against the risk that the interest rate exposure on the securitised assets (e.g., loans or mortgages) may differ from the financing costs or liabilities.

    How it Works: In an interest rate swap:
    The asset pool in the securitisation may consist of fixed-rate loans or floating-rate loans.


    The issuer or sponsor of the securitisation may enter into an interest rate swap agreement to convert the fixed interest payments on the asset pool into floating-rate payments (or vice versa) to better match the interest payments on the issued securities.


    For example, if the securitised assets are mostly fixed-rate loans, but the issuance of securities is based on floating rates (e.g., LIBOR), the issuer may enter into a swap agreement to receive fixed payments and pay floating payments, aligning the cash flows between the asset pool and the securities.


    Goal: The goal is to manage the mismatch between the interest rate profile of the assets and the financing costs or to protect against fluctuations in interest rates that could negatively impact the transaction.

    What is a Warehouse securitization ?

    Warehouse securitization refers to a financial process in which a lender or financial institution (typically a bank or a non-bank lender) aggregates and finances loans or assets in a warehouse (a pool of loans or receivables). These loans or assets are held in a “warehouse” and are later “securitized,” meaning they are repackaged into securities (such as bonds) that are sold to investors. This process is commonly used in asset-backed securities (ABS) and mortgage-backed securities (MBS).

    Steps Involved in Warehouse Securitization:


    Origination of Assets: The process begins when a financial institution originates or acquires a pool of loans or receivables (e.g., mortgages, auto loans, or credit card debt). These loans are placed into a “warehouse” or a special-purpose vehicle (SPV).

    Financing the Warehouse: The institution often uses short-term financing to hold these loans in the warehouse. This short-term financing is typically obtained through a warehouse line of credit from a lender or other financial institution.
    A warehouse line of credit
    A warehouse line of credit is a type of short-term financing used by financial institutions, lenders, or companies to fund the acquisition or holding of assets, typically loans or receivables, before they are sold or securitized. It is commonly used in industries like mortgage lending, asset-backed securities, and other forms of financial lending where assets need to be stored temporarily before they are sold or packaged for longer-term financing.

    Key Features of a Warehouse Line of Credit:
    Short-Term Nature: The warehouse line of credit is usually intended for short-term borrowing, often ranging from a few months to a year. It provides immediate access to liquidity to purchase or hold assets before they are sold or securitized.

    Revolving Credit: A warehouse line of credit is often structured as a revolving credit facility. This means that once a loan or asset is sold or securitized, the borrower can repay the borrowed funds and then reuse the available credit for additional assets. This revolving nature allows for flexibility in financing.

    Collateralized: The credit provided under a warehouse line of credit is typically secured by the assets purchased or held by the borrower. For example, in a mortgage warehouse line of credit, the warehouse lender may use the mortgages that the borrower holds as collateral.

    Used by Lenders: The warehouse line of credit is particularly common in industries like mortgage origination or asset-backed securities (ABS). Mortgage lenders, for example, use warehouse lines of credit to fund the mortgages they originate until they can sell these loans to investors or in the secondary market, thus repaying the line of credit.

    Securitization: A common use of warehouse lines of credit is to finance the acquisition of assets that will eventually be securitized (e.g., mortgages, auto loans, credit card receivables). The borrowed funds are used to buy and hold the assets until they can be packaged and sold as securities.

    Cost: The interest rates on warehouse lines of credit are typically higher than traditional loans, reflecting the short-term and higher-risk nature of the borrowing. The interest rate is often based on a benchmark rate plus a spread, depending on the terms of the agreement.

    How It Works:
    Step 1: A financial institution (e.g., a mortgage lender or auto loan originator) sets up a warehouse line of credit with a financial institution (e.g., a bank or another lender).

    Step 2: The borrower (lender) uses the line of credit to fund the acquisition of loans, mortgages, or receivables. These assets are typically held by the borrower until they can be sold or securitized.

    Step 3: Once the loans or assets are sold or securitized, the borrower repays the borrowed funds (principal and interest) to the lender, freeing up the credit line for future use.

    Step 4: The borrower can continue to draw on the warehouse line of credit to fund new assets, creating a revolving cycle of borrowing and repayment.

    Example:
    A mortgage lender might use a warehouse line of credit to finance the mortgages it originates. The lender borrows money from the warehouse lender to fund the mortgage loans. The lender then sells those mortgages to investors or a larger financial institution (such as a government agency or bank). Once the sale is made, the lender repays the warehouse line of credit. This cycle allows the mortgage lender to continue originating new loans without having to use its own capital.
    Advantages of a Warehouse Line of Credit:
    Liquidity: It provides immediate access to funds, allowing the borrower to acquire assets and continue operations without waiting for the sale of those assets.
    Flexibility: As a revolving credit line, it can be used multiple times to acquire additional assets.
    Short-Term Solution: It serves as a temporary financing solution, allowing for the acquisition and holding of assets before they are liquidated or securitized.
    Risks:
    Interest Costs: Since it is short-term and often secured by the assets themselves, the warehouse line of credit can be more expensive than traditional loans.
    Credit Risk: If the borrower is unable to sell or securitize the assets, they may face difficulty repaying the borrowed funds, leading to potential financial stress or even default.
    Overleveraging: If the borrower draws heavily on the warehouse line of credit without having a clear plan to sell or securitize the assets, they risk overleveraging themselves.
    In summary, a warehouse line of credit is a vital financial tool used to bridge the gap between acquiring assets and realizing liquidity through asset sales or securitization. It is commonly used in sectors like mortgage lending and securitization and provides short-term financing against the assets that are being held.

    What is securitisation?

    Securitisation is one of the most powerful and transformative financial instruments in modern markets, but it remains a complex and often misunderstood process. At its core, securitisation allows for the conversion of illiquid assets—such as loans, mortgages, or receivables—into tradable securities that can be bought, sold, and invested in by a broad range of market participants. This process has revolutionised the way institutions manage risk, allocate capital, and raise funds, while simultaneously creating new investment opportunities.


    Whether you are a financial professional, a legal expert, a student of finance, or someone simply interested in understanding the inner workings of global markets, this blogis your comprehensive guide to the world of securitisation. In these blogs, we explore the principles, structures, legal frameworks, and economic impacts of securitisation in detail, providing you with the knowledge necessary to navigate this often intricate and sometimes opaque field.


    Securitisation is not just a financial technique; it’s a concept that lies at the intersection of finance, law, economics, and risk management. Understanding it fully requires both a solid grasp of the financial markets and a familiarity with the legal structures that support these transactions. In this book, we bridge the gap between theory and practice, offering an accessible introduction to the subject while also delving into the nuances of the securitisation process.


    From the basic principles and types of securitisation to the detailed mechanics of asset-backed securities (ABS), collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), and mortgage-backed securities (MBS), this blog provides an in-depth look at how securitisation works. We explore how different types of securitisations are structured, the role of rating agencies, investors, and servicers, and the regulatory environment that governs these transactions.


    Moreover, we address the risks and benefits associated with securitisation, highlighting both its potential to enhance liquidity and create new funding channels, as well as the challenges and controversies that have arisen—particularly in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. By examining real-world examples and case studies, this book provides a practical perspective on how securitisation functions in today’s global financial system.


    In addition to the mechanics of securitisation itself, we also focus on the critical role of law and regulation in shaping securitisation transactions. The legal frameworks governing securitisation, from the structuring of special purpose vehicles (SPVs) to the complexities of credit enhancements, are explored in detail. Whether you’re involved in drafting agreements, negotiating terms, or ensuring compliance, understanding these legal structures is key to mastering the subject.

    Securitisation is a dynamic and evolving area of finance, and understanding it is crucial to anyone working in or studying the financial markets. We invite you to explore these blogs as a comprehensive resource that will not only enhance your knowledge but also empower you to engage confidently in the world of securitisation.

    What are the differences between a warehouse deal and a term deal


    The primary difference between a warehouse deal and a term deal lies in the structure of the financing, the timing, and the specific nature of the agreements involved. These types of deals are often used in the context of financing transactions such as loans, mortgages, or other asset-backed securities, but they function differently in terms of the duration and structure of the credit.

    The key differences between a warehouse deal and a term deal:

    1. Purpose and Use
      Warehouse Deal:

      ]A warehouse deal is typically a short-term financing arrangement used to fund the acquisition or holding of assets (such as loans, receivables, or mortgages) before they are sold, securitized, or otherwise liquidated. The financing provided in a warehouse deal is usually intended for temporary holding of assets until they can be moved onto the secondary market or packaged into a security.
      It is often used by lenders to finance the origination of loans or mortgages, where the lender borrows funds on a short-term basis to originate loans and then sells them to another investor or institution after a short period.
      Term Deal:
      A term deal, on the other hand, is a longer-term financing arrangement. It is typically used to fund long-term capital needs and involves a loan or credit facility that is repaid over an extended period (e.g., several years).
      In a term deal, the borrower receives a lump sum or a series of payments and repays the debt over a fixed term, typically at a set interest rate and with a defined repayment schedule.
    2. Duration
      Warehouse Deal:

      Short-Term: Warehouse lines of credit are short-term, often ranging from a few months to a year, depending on the deal. The borrower may use the credit facility repeatedly (revolving) as they acquire and sell assets.
      The goal is to finance the purchase of assets temporarily before those assets are sold or securitized.
      Term Deal:
      Long-Term: Term loans or deals typically have longer durations, often spanning several years. The repayment is done over a structured time frame (e.g., monthly, quarterly, or annually) based on the terms agreed upon at the outset of the deal.
      The borrower is expected to repay the principal and interest over time according to the agreed-upon schedule.
    3. Repayment Structure
      Warehouse Deal:

      Revolving: In a warehouse deal, the facility is usually revolving. The borrower can borrow and repay funds multiple times (like a line of credit) as they acquire and sell assets. Once assets are sold, the loan is repaid, and the borrower can access the funds again for new assets.
      The repayment is typically tied to the liquidation or sale of the assets.
      Term Deal:
      Fixed Payments: In a term deal, the borrower typically receives a lump sum of money or a series of disbursements and then repays the loan in fixed installments over the life of the loan, often with interest. The payment structure is rigid and defined from the outset.
      Repayments are usually scheduled and predictable over the life of the loan.
    4. Collateral
      Warehouse Deal:

      Secured by Assets: Warehouse financing is usually secured by the assets the borrower is holding (e.g., mortgages, loans, receivables). The collateral provides security to the lender in case the borrower defaults on the loan.
      The borrower may be required to pledge the assets they acquire as collateral for the warehouse line of credit.
      Term Deal:
      Secured or Unsecured: Term loans can be either secured (backed by collateral, such as property or equipment) or unsecured (where no specific assets are pledged as security). The specific nature of the collateral will depend on the agreement between the borrower and the lender.
      If secured, term loans often have specific collateral tied to the loan.
    5. Interest Rate
      Warehouse Deal:

      Higher Interest Rates: Warehouse lines of credit typically have higher interest rates than term loans. This is due to the short-term and higher-risk nature of the financing, as well as the flexibility of the revolving structure.
      The interest rate is often based on a short-term benchmark rate (such as LIBOR or SOFR) plus a spread.
      Term Deal:

      Lower Interest Rates: Term loans typically have lower interest rates compared to warehouse lines of credit, particularly if they are secured by collateral. The interest rate is usually fixed or based on a longer-term benchmark rate.
      Since the term deal is longer in duration and involves more stable repayment terms, the lender often offers more favorable interest rates.
    6. Liquidity and Flexibility
      Warehouse Deal:

      High Liquidity and Flexibility: Warehouse deals provide borrowers with high liquidity and flexibility, as they can borrow and repay funds repeatedly as they acquire and sell assets. The borrower can access additional funds as needed to acquire more assets.
      This revolving nature allows the borrower to maintain flexibility in managing their operations and financing.
      Term Deal:
      Lower Liquidity and Flexibility: Term loans are less flexible in comparison, as the borrower is committed to a fixed repayment schedule over a set period. There is no ability to access additional funds unless the borrower seeks refinancing or a new loan.
      The repayment obligations are fixed, which means the borrower must have the ability to meet the regular payments.
    7. Examples of Use
      Warehouse Deal:

      Commonly used by mortgage lenders, auto loan originators, and asset-backed securities (ABS) issuers who need short-term funding to purchase loans or receivables, with the intent to sell those assets in the secondary market or securitize them into securities.
      Term Deal:
      Commonly used for long-term financing needs such as business loans, real estate loans, or corporate financing, where the borrower requires capital for a longer period and repays the debt in structured installments over time.

      Summary
      In summary, warehouse deals are short-term, revolving credit facilities used to fund the acquisition or holding of assets until they can be sold or securitized. They are more flexible but carry higher interest rates due to their short-term nature. Term deals, on the other hand, are longer-term loans with fixed repayment schedules and typically lower interest rates. They are used for capital-intensive financing needs and often involve predictable repayments over a set period.

    Does the Trustee’s right of indemnity have priority over the right of beneficiaries in relation to assets?

    In Chief Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Buckle, the High Court held that a trustee’s right of indemnity out of trust assets was not an encumbrance upon the interests of the beneficiaries.

    Until the trustee’s right of reimbursement or exoneration has been satisfied, it is impossible to say what the trust fund is, in the sense that it is impossible to identify assets which are held solely upon trusts binding the trustee in favour of the beneficiaries.

    The right of a trustee to be indemnified has priority over the right of beneficiaries in relation to the assets.

    This make sense to me and although the High Court didnt have the need to mention it, this analysis operates conceptually in the same way that a partner’s interest in a partnership isnt known until there is an account taken of the partnership assets.

    The trustee’s right of indemnity is a fantastic aspect of the law of trusts and is the basis on which all contractual claims are made through the Trustee against the Trust assets. More on this later.

    Reference: Chief Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Buckle (1998) 192 CLR 226 at 245-247 [47]-[51].

    Beneficiary actions – ‘Special Circumstances’

    Source: Colin R Price & Associates Pty Ltd v Four Oaks Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 75

    1. Where “special circumstances” exist, a beneficiary under a trust such as Grovan may bring proceedings that ordinarily should be brought by the trustee in his, her or its own right against a third party or other beneficiary on any cause of action, legal equitable or statutory, that the trustee has against that defendant. The beneficiary must join the trustee and the third party as defendants if such special circumstances exist: TAL Life Ltd v Shuetrim (2016) 91 NSWLR 439; [2016] NSWCA 68 (TAL) at [54] (Leeming JA with whom Beazley P and Emmett AJA agreed); Lidden v Composite Buyers Ltd (1996) 67 FCR 560 (Lidden) at 563-564 (Finn J); Ramage v Waclaw (1988) 12 NSWLR 84 (Ramage) at 91-93 (Powell J); Sharpe v San Paulo Railway Co (1873) LR 8 Ch App 597 at 609-610 (James LJ). See too: Heydon JD and Leeming MJ, Jacobs’Law of Trusts in Australia (7th ed, Butterworths, 2006) at [2303].
    2. In Alexander v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 109; [2004] HCA 7 (Alexander) at [55]-[56] Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ (and see also Callinan J at [163]-[164] with whom McHugh J agreed at [67]) said that one reason for the restriction – to where there are “specialcircumstances” of a beneficiary’s right to sue a third party directly on a cause of action that ought to be properly brought by a trustee – was to avoid the vexation of the third party by multiple suits. Their Honours approved what Powell J said in Ramage at 91-92, that the “special circumstances” were not confined to collusion between the trustee and the third party or the insolvency of the trustee. Their Honours went on to say that the general principle was to be found in the following passage from Scott on Trusts (4th ed, 1989) Vol 4 at [282]:

      The interests of the beneficiaries of a trust are protected against a third person acting adversely to the trustee through proceedings brought against him by the trustee and not by the beneficiaries. As long as the trustee is ready and willing to take the proper proceedings against the third person, the beneficiaries cannot maintain a suit against him.

    3. In Alexander, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ (at [56]) and Callinan J (at [163]) referred, with apparent approval, (as did Leeming JA in TAL at [54]) to the advice of the Privy Council given by Lord Templeman in Hayim v Citibank NA [1987] AC 730 at 748, namely:

      [The] authorities demonstrate that a beneficiary has no cause of action against a third party save in special circumstances which embrace a failure, excusable or inexcusable, by the trustee in the performance of the duty owned by the trustees to the beneficiary to protect the trust estate or to protect the interests of the beneficiary in the trust estate.

      (Emphasis added.)

    4. In Lidden (at 563-564) Finn J explained that the requirement for “special circumstances” should not be limited to claims that a trustee has against the third party for equitable relief, and that such action could also be brought by a beneficiary in respect of claims at common law or under statute. His Honour said:

      …it is not at all apparent to me why, today, we should insist on a multiplicity of suits – as the older equity rule, unmodified, would require – for the purpose of resolving a matter which gives rise to claims for other, as well as equitable, relief: cf Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 22.

      The distinction between claims for equitable and for other relief has not commended itself to United States courts or text writers. Likewise it seems to have been ignored in observations made in Privy Council cases. So, for example, it is said in Scott and Fratcher, The Law of Trusts (4th ed), Vol 4, par 282.1:

      “If the trustee improperly refuses to bring an action against a third person who commits a tort with respect to the trust property, the beneficiaries can maintain a suit in equity against the trustee to compel him to do his duty and to bring the proper action against the third person. In the earlier law this was all that the beneficiaries could do. It was later held, however, that the whole controversy can be settled in a single suit, and in order to avoid multiplicity of suits the beneficiaries were permitted to join the third person as a co-defendant with the trustee, thus avoiding the necessity of two suits, one in equity by the beneficiaries against the trustee and another at law by the trustee against the third person. In such a proceeding the trustee is a necessary party defendant if he can be subjected to the jurisdiction of the court.”

      To illustrate this approach, this time in a contractual setting, the authors refer to observations of Lord Wright in the Privy Council in Vandepitte v Preferred Accident Insurance Corporation of New York [1933] AC 70 at 79:

      “a party to a contract can constitute himself a trustee for a third party of a right under the contract and thus confer such rights enforceable in equity on the third party. The trustee then can take steps to enforce performance to the beneficiary by the other contracting party as in the case of other equitable rights. The action should be in the name of the trustee; if, however, he refuses to sue, the beneficiary can sue, joining the trustee as a defendant.”

      I should add that to like effect in my view are the comments of the Privy Council in Hayim v Citibank NA [1987] AC 730 at 748, though the relief there sought was equitable. See also G G Bogert, G T Bogert and W K Stevens, The Law of Trusts and Trustees (Revised 2nd ed, 1977), par 869 where the subject is considered at length.

      In the absence of any compelling reason in a Judicature Act system to limit the right of a beneficiary to claim equitable relief alone, in light of the approach taken in the authorities I have referred to, and given the undesirability of adhering to an approach which promotes multiplicity of suits, I am prepared to hold that, provided the other – the “exceptional” or “special” circumstances – requirement of the rule is met, it is not necessary in a Judicature Act system that the relief be equitable or equitable alone that is sought by the beneficiary instituting proceedings for a trust.

    Marketing practices in initial public offerings (IPO) of securities Report 494

    From Report 494 Marketing practices in initial public offerings of securities September 2016.

    The report outlines the key findings from reviews we conducted by ASIC to examine how initial public offerings (IPOs) are marketed to retail investors. ASIC particularly considered the extent to which social media has become important for marketing. The report identifies some risks and recommendations that may be useful for firms and issuers to consider when developing an IPO marketing strategy.

    Of particular importance was the area of concern identified in the report. They are summarised below.

    Oversight weakness: Telephone communications

    Firms should apply tighter controls over the marketing and selling of IPOs by telephone, such as:

    1. providing employees with standardised telephone scripts;
    2. recording and routinely reviewing telephone calls with clients;
    3. applying stricter requirements on documenting telephone calls with clients; and
    4. compliance staff routinely sitting at the sales desk when telephone calls are made
      to clients.

    Oversight weakness: Social media posts

    Firms should apply controls on social media posts similar to those in place for other
    marketing, such as:

    1. educating employees on using social media for marketing IPOs in compliance
      with the Corporations Act; and
    2. ensuring that social media posts are reviewed before being posted.

    Misleading communication: Marketing an IPO other than on its merits

    Firms should ensure that marketing:

    1. is based on the merits of the IPO itself; and
    2. is not based primarily on asking investors to assist with meeting spread
      requirements, or on comparisons with other successful IPOs conducted by
      the firm.

    Misleading communication: Prominence of forecasts

    Firms and issuers should:

    1. take care when using forecasts to market IPOs, and not give undue weight to
      forecasts in the marketing messages; and
    2. if forecasts are used, ensure the assumptions and risks of the forecasts are also
      included in the marketing material.

    Misleading communication: Marketing of emerging market issuers

    Firms and issuers targeting investors from a non-English speaking background
    should:

    1. ensure that communications are clear and accurate (including any statements
      about the regulatory framework in Australia and about ASIC’s role); and
    2. if marketing material is being produced in a language other than English, ensure
      these materials are fully understood by the firm or issuer, including getting
      translations before publication (if necessary).

    Failure to monitor: Failing to update multimedia marketing including videos

    Firms and issuers should check that:

    1. the content of videos used to market IPOs is accurate and consistent with
      disclosure in the prospectus; and
    2. the content of any videos remains correct after any changes or updates are made
      to a prospectus.

    Inadequate controls on access to information: Access to institutional roadshows

    Firms should apply tighter controls and educate their employees to limit access to
    institutional roadshows to AFS licensees and their representatives.

    Inadequate controls on access to information: Potential access to pathfinder prospectus

    Firms should:

    1. apply tighter controls and educate their employees to limit access to restricted
      material (including pathfinder prospectuses) to sophisticated or professional
      investors;
    2. educate their employees about the need to limit circulation of restricted material
      (including pathfinder prospectuses) before the prospectus is lodged with ASIC;
      and
    3. ensure that restricted material (including pathfinder prospectuses) or passwords
      to access restricted material are not distributed by email.

    Inadequate controls on access to information: Disseminating information
    before a prospectus is lodged

    Firms and issuers should not provide materials about an upcoming offer to the
    media. If marketing is given to persons before a prospectus is lodged with ASIC, on the
    basis of those persons being a sophisticated or professional investor, firms and
    issuers should ensure that the recipient actually falls within this category.

    Before providing the information, firms and issuers should undertake additional
    verification (e.g. obtain an accountant’s certificate) to ensure that the person is a
    sophisticated or professional investor. Self-certification by a person is not sufficient.

    Trustee – exercise of discretion

    A helpful summary of the principles concerning the grounds on which the exercise of a trustee’s power can be challenged is found in a passage from the decision of Northrop J in Clerical Administrative and Related Employees Superannuation Pty Ltd v Bishop (1997) 76 IR 139, which was cited on appeal by Heerey J (Wilkinson v Clerical Administrative and Related Employees Superannuation Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 51; (1998) 79 FCR 469 at 480) and referred to by the High Court in Attorney-General for the Commonwealth v Breckler (1999) 197 CLR 87 at 99-100 ([7]) per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ:

    “Where a trustee exercises a discretion, it may be impugned on a number of different bases such as that it was exercised in bad faith, arbitrarily, capriciously, wantonly, irresponsibly, mischievously or irrelevantly to any sensible expectation of the settlor, or without giving a real or genuine consideration to the exercise of the discretion. The exercise of a discretion by trustees cannot of course be impugned upon the basis that their discretion was unfair or unreasonable or unwise. Where a discretion is expressed to be absolute it may be that bad faith needs to be shown. The soundness of the exercise of a discretion can be examined where reasons have been given, but the test is not fairness or reasonableness”.

    See also the judgment of Kirby J, who regarded the summary as an accurate one, at 115 ([58]).

    Example of such analysis

    26 Accepting that where no reasons are given, the test is whether there has been a failure of the trustee to act “with an absence of indirect motive, with honesty of intention, and with a fair consideration of the issues”, a phrase used in Jacobs at [1610] and one based upon Truro LC’s words in In re Beloved Wilkes’s Charity [1851] EngR 375; (1851) 3 Mac & G 440 at 448[1851] EngR 375; , 42 ER 330 at 333, cited with approval by Sheller JA in Hartigan Nominees Pty Ltd v Rydge (1992) 29 NSWLR 405 at 441-442, the question is whether, when reasons are given by the trustee, a different test is to be used. Jacobs states at [1610] that if reasons are given “the court may consider the validity of such reasons and, if it feels that the reasons do not justify the decisions, may correct the decisions accordingly”. Wilkes’s and Hartigan are cited in support of this proposition.
    27 In Karger v Paul [1984] VicRp 13; [1984] VR 161, McGarvie J said at 165-166:

    “It is an established general principle that unless trustees choose to give reasons for the exercise of a discretion, their exercise of the discretion can not be examined or reviewed by a court so long as they act in good faith and without an ulterior purpose: Re Beloved Wilkes’ Charity [1851] 3 Mac and G 440; [1851] EngR 375; 42 ER 330; Duke of Portland v Topham [1864] EngR 339; (1864) 11 HLC 31; 11 ER 1242. For reasons given above, I would add the further requirement, so obvious that it is often not mentioned, that they act upon real and genuine consideration. In the context, it was in that sense that Lord Truro LC used the expression “with a fair consideration” in Re Beloved Wilkes’ Charity, at (42 ER) p. 333. In the case of an absolute and unrestricted discretion such as the discretion in the present case, the general principle is given unqualified operation: Gisborne v Gisborne (1877) 2 App Cas 300, at p. 305, per Lord Cairns LC; Tabor v Brooks (1878) 10 Ch D 273; Craig v National Trustees Executors and Agency Company of Australia Ltd. [1920] VicLawRp 101; [1920] VLR 569. The operation of the principle is discussed in Jacobs’ Law of Trusts in Australia, 4th ed., pp. 300-2.”

    (emphasis added)
    28 In addition to the obiter dictum in Karger, I have had regard, in this connection, to The King v The Archbishop of Canterbury [1812] EngR 102; (1812) 15 East 117, 104 ER 789; Wilkes’s; Re Knollys’ Trusts [1912] 2 Ch 357; Dundee General Hospitals Board of Management v Walker [1952] 1 All ER 896; Rydge v Hartigan Nominees Pty Ltd (unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Young J, 12 September 1990), and on appealsupra; Meat Industry Employees Superannuation Fund v Petrucelli (unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Nathan J, 29 February 1992, BC9200730); Asea Brown Boveri Superannuation Fund No 1 Pty Ltd v Asea Brown Boveri Pty Ltd [1999] 1 VR 144; the passage from Wilkinson cited in Breckler and set out at [21] above; and a note of Mr David Maclean, ‘Beneficiary’s Right to See Confidential Trust Documents’ (1993) 67 ALJ 703, to which reference is also made in Jacobs. In Wilkes’s, Truro LC said at 448:

    “it is to the discretion of the trustees that the execution of the trust is confided, that discretion being exercised with an entire absence of indirect motive, with honesty of intention, and with a fair consideration of the subject. The duty of supervision on the part of this Court will thus be confined to the question of the honesty, integrity, and fairness with which the deliberation has been conducted, and will not be extended to the accuracy of the conclusion arrived at, except in particular cases. If, however, as stated by Lord Ellenborough in The King v The Archbishop of Canterbury [1812] EngR 102;(15 East, 117), trustees think fit to state a reason, and the reason is one which does not justify their conclusion, then the Court may say that they have acted by mistake and in error, and that it will correct their decision; but if, without entering into details, they simply state, as in many cases it would be most prudent and judicious for them to do, that they have met and considered and come to aconclusion, the Court has then no means of saying that they have failed in their duty, or to consider the accuracy of their conclusion.”

    (emphasis added)

    29 I note that the learned authors of Jacobs, after setting out the general test, said at [1610]:

    “The duty of the court generally is to see that the discretion of the trustees has been exercised in this manner and not to deal with the accuracy of the conclusion at which the trustees may have arrived.”

    with Wilkes’s and Hartigan in the Court of Appeal cited in support.

    30 In Dundee, it was argued that when reasons are given, the Court can more readily examine and correct the trustee’s decision. Lord Normand said at 900:

    “It was said for the appellants that the courts have greater liberty to examine and correct a decision committed by a testator to his trustees, if they choose to give reasons, than if they do not. In my opinion, that is erroneous. The principles on which the courts must proceed are the same whether the reasons for the trustees’ decision are disclosed or not, but, of course, it becomes easier to examine a decision if the reasons for it have been disclosed. Lord Truro’s judgment in Re Wilkes’s (Beloved) Charity ought not to be construed as going beyond that.”

    Lord Cohen expressed some support for the view that if the reasons given by the trustee, even on a matter for the trustee’s absolute discretion, demonstrate an approach that no reasonable person could have taken to the matter at hand, this is sufficient to demonstrate that the discretion has miscarried, but Lord Tucker did not, saying that in his view, nothing short of dishonesty on the part of the trustees in arriving at their decision would suffice (at 907). Lord Morton, whilst willing to adopt the appellant’s test for the purposes of the case, did not accept that it was an appropriate test. Lord Reid, whilst prepared to proceed on that basis, indicated that he wished to reserve his opinion on the point.
    31 Even in Wilkes’s, where trustees had to determine who should be selected to be trained for the Church ministry, Truro LC, after having set out the passage referred to by Lord Normand, did consider whether there was anything in the trustees’ affidavits which laid the foundation “for any judicial conclusion that the trustees intentionally and from bad motives failed in their duty” (at 449), and his Lordship later referred to the fact that it had not been established that the trustees had adopted an exclusionary rule for which there was no warrant, which rather suggests that the Lord Chancellor was not intending to lay down a principle that the Court could, absent some established breach of the requirements, consider whether the trustees’ decision itself was erroneous or wrong. Ellenborough CJ’s approach in The Archbishop of Canterbury does not provide support for any wide power of review of the decision of the person exercising the discretion. In that case, a bishop, pursuant to a statutory provision, had to decide whether a candidate was suitable for appointment as a lecturer at a parish church, and the bishop had been ordered to provide an affidavit giving his reasons. His Lordship commented at page 141 of East’s:

    “It only requires him first to approve, that is, before he licences; and in so doing, it virtually requires him to exercise his conscience duly informed upon the subject; to do which he must duly, impartially, and effectually inquire, examine, deliberate and decide. If the Court have reason to think that any thing is defectively done in this respect, it will interpose its authoritative admonition. The mandamus to license, if the party shall be found to be a fit person, is a solemn and peremptory call upon the bishop to adopt the requisite means for duly informing his conscience, in order to the correct and effectual exercise of this most important duty.”

    and at page 146:
    “what scales have we to weigh the conscience of the bishop?”; see also page 153 of East’s, where his Lordship said:

    “Now if we were trying the validity and correctness of the bishop’s conclusions, and going into all the facts of the case (which I disclaim our authority for doing) there was before the bishop the evidence of a person who gives his information at an unsuspicious period, when there was no question depending and no interest to be served or prejudiced by it.”

    32 In Esso Australia Ltd v Australian Petroleum Agents’ & Distributors’ Association [1999] 3 VR 642 at 652-653, Hayne J said that the Court “will not sit on general appeal from the decisions of the trustee”.
    33 In Petrucelli, Nathan J, in setting out his views of the limits of review by the Court when reasons are advanced and after noting that the exercise of discretion means no more than arriving fairly at a conclusion from a number of options or alternatives, said at page 8 of BC9200730 that the Court’s function was to consider:

    “(1) Whether the reasons relate to or are relevant to the discretion to be exercised. (2) Whether the reasons were arrived at in good faith and without an ulterior purpose (see Karger and Beloved Wilkes Charity (1851) 3 Mac and Eg 440; [1851] EngR 375; 42 ER 330). (3) Whether the reasons reasonably support the conclusion. (4) It is open to the court to look at evidence of the enquiries made by the trustees, the information they had and the manner of the exercise of their discretion, but only [so] far as to assess the viability of the exercise, not to impugn or replace it. (5) It is not open to the Court to examine the reasons for the purposes of exercising its own discretion. It is not open to the Court to examine the factual situation for the purposes of substituting its own discretion for that of the trustee because the Court might consider the trustee unwise or imprudent (see also Dundee Hospital v Walker (1952) 1 All ER 896). (6) It follows as a compelling matter of logic that the reviewable discretion is that which was exercised by the trustees at the time.”

    34 Having regard to the authorities, and particularly what was said in Dundee, Rydge at first instance and Petrucelli, I proceed on the basis that where reasons are given, the Court can have regard to those reasons in forming a view as to whether the trustee has:

    (1) acted for an indirect motive;

    (2) acted without honesty of intention;

    (3) acted without a fair or real and genuine consideration of whether and how the discretion should be exercised; and

    (4) acted for a purpose beyond that for which the power and discretion were bestowed on it.
    35 I am, with respect, attracted to the view expressed by Lord Normand that the principles on which the Court must proceed are the same whether reasons are given or not. When reasons are provided, the determination of whether breach has occurred may well be made easier, but this does not alter the test. I think this conclusion is consistent with the last sentence of the passage from Wilkinson cited in Breckler and set out at [21] above. From a practical point of view, I think it would be undesirable that trustees be discouraged from giving reasons for a decision, when asked, for fear that the provision of reasons would lead to a more expansive power of review than if they gave no reasons.

    38 In Telstra Super Pty Ltd v Flegeltaub [2000] VSCA 180; (2000) 2 VR 276 at 284, Callaway JA expressed the view that if the decision were one which no reasonable trustee could make on the material before it, this would establish a breach. This approach was adopted by Bryson J in Sayseng v Kellogg Superannuation Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 945 at [62]; and see Hay v Total Risk Management Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 94, where these cases were reviewed and Burchett AJ said at [56]:

    “the trustee’s decision, applying the test that has so far been accepted by the courts, will only be overturned if it is such as no reasonable trustee could have arrived at upon the material considered. However, a reasonable trustee would hold to a high standard in the consideration of such a matter, which involves important rights of a contractual nature.”

    From Manglicmot v Commonwealth Bank Officers Superannuation Corporation [2010] NSWSC 363

    Trustee’s duties

    Trustees duties:

    (1) it owes its members a duty to act in the members’ best interests: see Cowan v Scargill [1984] 2 All ER 750 at 760 per Sir Robert Megarry VC:

    “The starting point is the duty of trustees to exercise their powers in the best interests of the present and future beneficiaries of the trust, holding the scales impartially between the different classes of beneficiaries. This duty of the trustees towards their beneficiaries is paramount. They must, of course, obey the law; but subject to that, they must put the interests of their beneficiaries first. When the purpose of the trust is to provide financial benefits for the beneficiaries, as is usually the case, the best interest of the beneficiaries are normally their best financial interests.”

    (2) it owes a duty to act impartially, excluding from consideration matters which are irrelevant and giving proper consideration to matters which are relevant: see Edge v Pensioners Ombudsman [1999] EWCA Civ 2013; [1999] 4 All ER 546 at 567.

    (3) it owes members of the Fund a duty to exercise reasonable care, and it has been said that this duty will be discharged if it “takes in managing trust affairs all those precautions which an ordinary prudent man of business would take in managing similar affairs of his own”: Speight v Gaunt (1883) 9 App Cas 1 at 19 per Lord Blackburn, adopted in Austin v Austin  [1906] HCA 5 ;  (1906) 3 CLR 516  at 525, see also Elder’s Trustee and Executor Company Limited v Higgins [1963] HCA 48; (1962) 113 CLR 426 at 448; “a trustee is not a surety, nor is he an insurer”: see In re Chapman [1896] 2 Ch 763 at 775 per Lindley LJ.

    (4) it must act honestly and in good faith: see J D Heydon and M J Leeming, Jacobs’ Law of Trusts in Australia (7th ed, 2006), LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney (“Jacobs”) at [1608] and the cases there cited.

    (5) it must take an informed view of whether or not to exercise its discretion and not act irresponsibly, capriciously or wantonly: see Jacobs supra;

    (6) it must exercise its power with due consideration for the purpose for which the power was conferred and not some ulterior purpose: see Jacobs supra.

     

    From Manglicmot v Commonwealth Bank Officers Superannuation Corporation [2010] NSWSC 363

    Trustees rights on removal (indemnification and exoneration)

    Caterpillar Financial Australia Limited v Ovens Nominees Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 677

     If a corporate trustee is removed as trustee by the operation of a disqualification clause in the trust deed, the position is as follows:

    (i)          notwithstanding the appointment of a new trustee, as the former trustee, it retains its right of indemnity and/or exoneration (described above). These rights may be enforced by its liquidator against the trust assets, although it is not clear how, as the former trustee, its liquidator would proceed to enforce them (at [18] and [20]);

    (ii)         there is conflicting authority (Re Suco Gold Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (1983) 33 SASR 99 per King CJ and Lemery Holdings Pty Ltd v Reliance Financial Services Pty Ltd[2008] NSWSC 1344 per Brereton J) as to whether, as the former trustee, it has the right to retain trust assets as security for any accrued right of indemnity as against any new or replacement trustee (at [19] and [21]–[25]);

    (iii)        the position will be different where there has not been, and will not be, a new or replacement trustee appointed.  In that event, as the former trustee, it continues as bare trustee of the trust assets and retains its right of indemnity and/or exoneration and its lien over the trust assets ([26]); and

    (iv)         however, as a bare trustee, its duties, powers and rights are limited to protecting the trust assets and that does not include any power of sale of the trust assets (at [26] and [28]);