Truth and Credibility of witnesses

Coote v Kelly; Northam v Kelly [2016] NSWSC 1447 is a medical negligence case which involved an alleged failure to diagnose a melanoma on the sole of the foot of the plaintiff.

In Coote Davies J had to weigh up the competing evidence of the Plaintiff and the deceased on the one hand and the four doctors on the other hand about the state or condition of a lesion – whether the lesion had appearance of plantar wart or melanoma.

His Honour made the following salient and considered observations.

  1. In Onassis and Calogeropoulos v Vergottis [1968] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 403 Lord Pearce discussed credibility. The first two matters he raised dealt with truthfulness, and he then went on to say (at 431):

Thirdly, though he is a truthful person telling the truth as he sees it, did he register the intentions of the conversation correctly and, if so, has his memory correctly retained them? Also, has his recollection been subsequently altered by unconscious bias or wishful thinking or by overmuch discussion of it with others? Witnesses, especially those who are emotional, who think that they are morally in the right, tend very easily and unconsciously to conjure up a legal right that did not exist. It is a truism, often used in accident cases, that with every day that passes the memory becomes fainter and the imagination becomes more active. For that reason a witness, however honest, rarely persuades a Judge that his present recollection is preferable to that which was taken down in writing immediately after the accident occurred. Therefore, contemporary documents are always of the utmost importance. And lastly, although the honest witness believes he heard or saw this or that, is it so improbable that it is on balance more likely that he was mistaken? On this point it is essential that the balance of probability is put correctly into the scales in weighing the credibility of a witness. And motive is one aspect of probability. All these problems compendiously are entailed when a Judge assesses the credibility of a witness; they are all part of one judicial process. And in the process contemporary documents and admitted or incontrovertible facts and probabilities must play their proper part.

  1. In Gestmin SGPS S.A. v Credit Suisse (UK) Limited [2013] EWHC 3560 (Comm) Leggatt J said:

[15]   An obvious difficulty which affects allegations and oral evidence based on recollection of events which occurred several years ago is the unreliability of human memory.

 

[16]   While everyone knows that memory is fallible, I do not believe that the legal system has sufficiently absorbed the lessons of a century of psychological research into the nature of memory and the unreliability of eyewitness testimony. One of the most important lessons of such research is that in everyday life we are not aware of the extent to which our own and other people’s memories are unreliable and believe our memories to be more faithful than they are. Two common (and related) errors are to suppose: (1) that the stronger and more vivid is our feeling or experience of recollection, the more likely the recollection is to be accurate; and (2) that the more confident another person is in their recollection, the more likely their recollection is to be accurate.

 

[17]   Underlying both these errors is a faulty model of memory as a mental record which is fixed at the time of experience of an event and then fades (more or less slowly) over time. In fact, psychological research has demonstrated that memories are fluid and malleable, being constantly rewritten whenever they are retrieved. This is true even of so-called ‘flashbulb’ memories, that is memories of experiencing or learning of a particularly shocking or traumatic event. (The very description ‘flashbulb’ memory is in fact misleading, reflecting as it does the misconception that memory operates like a camera or other device that makes a fixed record of an experience.) External information can intrude into a witness’s memory, as can his or her own thoughts and beliefs, and both can cause dramatic changes in recollection. Events can come to be recalled as memories which did not happen at all or which happened to someone else (referred to in the literature as a failure of source memory).

 

[18]   Memory is especially unreliable when it comes to recalling past beliefs. Our memories of past beliefs are revised to make them more consistent with our present beliefs. Studies have also shown that memory is particularly vulnerable to interference and alteration when a person is presented with new information or suggestions about an event in circumstances where his or her memory of it is already weak due to the passage of time.

 

[19]   The process of civil litigation itself subjects the memories of witnesses to powerful biases. The nature of litigation is such that witnesses often have a stake in a particular version of events. This is obvious where the witness is a party or has a tie of loyalty (such as an employment relationship) to a party to the proceedings. Other, more subtle influences include allegiances created by the process of preparing a witness statement and of coming to court to give evidence for one side in the dispute. A desire to assist, or at least not to prejudice, the party who has called the witness or that party’s lawyers, as well as a natural desire to give a good impression in a public forum, can be significant motivating forces.

 

[20]   Considerable interference with memory is also introduced in civil litigation by the procedure of preparing for trial. A witness is asked to make a statement, often (as in the present case) when a long time has already elapsed since the relevant events. The statement is usually drafted for the witness by a lawyer who is inevitably conscious of the significance for the issues in the case of what the witness does nor does not say. The statement is made after the witness’s memory has been “refreshed” by reading documents. The documents considered often include statements of case and other argumentative material as well as documents which the witness did not see at the time or which came into existence after the events which he or she is being asked to recall. The statement may go through several iterations before it is finalised. Then, usually months later, the witness will be asked to re-read his or her statement and review documents again before giving evidence in court. The effect of this process is to establish in the mind of the witness the matters recorded in his or her own statement and other written material, whether they be true or false, and to cause the witness’s memory of events to be based increasingly on this material and later interpretations of it rather than on the original experience of the events.

 

[21]   It is not uncommon (and the present case was no exception) for witnesses to be asked in cross-examination if they understand the difference between recollection and reconstruction or whether their evidence is a genuine recollection or a reconstruction of events. Such questions are misguided in at least two ways. First, they erroneously presuppose that there is a clear distinction between recollection and reconstruction, when all remembering of distant events involves reconstructive processes. Second, such questions disregard the fact that such processes are largely unconscious and that the strength, vividness and apparent authenticity of memories is not a reliable measure of their truth.

 

[22]   In the light of these considerations, the best approach for a judge to adopt in the trial of a commercial case is, in my view, to place little if any reliance at all on witnesses’ recollections of what was said in meetings and conversations, and to base factual findings on inferences drawn from the documentary evidence and known or probable facts. This does not mean that oral testimony serves no useful purpose – though its utility is often disproportionate to its length. But its value lies largely, as I see it, in the opportunity which cross-examination affords to subject the documentary record to critical scrutiny and to gauge the personality, motivations and working practices of a witness, rather than in testimony of what the witness recalls of particular conversations and events. Above all, it is important to avoid the fallacy of supposing that, because a witness has confidence in his or her recollection and is honest, evidence based on that recollection provides any reliable guide to the truth.

 

  1. In Campbell v Campbell [2015] NSWSC 784 Sackar J said:

[73] In Watson v Foxman (1995) 49 NSWLR 315 and 319, McLelland CJ in Eq made the following remarks:

 

…human memory of what was said in a conversation is fallible for a variety of reasons, and ordinarily the degree of fallibility increases with the passage of time, particularly where disputes or litigation intervene, and the processes of memory are overlaid, often subconsciously, by perceptions or self-interest as well as conscious consideration of what should have been said or could have been said. All too often what is actually remembered is little more than an impression from which plausible details are then, again often subconsciously, constructed. All this is a matter of ordinary human experience.

 

[74] I made the following observations in Craig v Silverbrook [2013] NSWSC 1687 at [140]-[142]:

 

[140]   Whilst a trial judge is entitled to make observations relating to the demeanour of certain witnesses, it is a notoriously crude and inaccurate methodology. Its defects have been exposed on numerous occasions.

 

[141 In that regard, I am of course mindful of the comments of Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ in Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118 (at [30]-[31]) when they remarked (citations omitted):

 

[30]   It is true, as McHugh J has pointed out, that for a very long time judges in appellate courts have given as a reason for appellate deference to the decision of a trial judge, the assessment of the appearance of witnesses as they give their testimony that is possible at trial and normally impossible in an appellate court. However, it is equally true that, for almost as long, other judges have cautioned against the dangers of too readily drawing conclusions about truthfulness and reliability solely or mainly from the appearance of witnesses. Thus, in 1924 Atkin LJ observed in Societe d’Avances Commerciales (Societe Anonyme Egyptienne) v Merchants Marine Insurance Co (The “Palitana”):

 

“… I think that an ounce of intrinsic merit or demerit in the evidence, that is to say, the value of the comparison of evidence with known facts, is worth pounds of demeanour.”

 

[31]   Further, in recent years, judges have become more aware of scientific research that has cast doubt on the ability of judges (or anyone else) to tell truth from falsehood accurately on the basis of such appearances. Considerations such as these have encouraged judges, both at trial and on appeal, to limit their reliance on the appearances of witnesses and to reason to their conclusions, as far as possible, on the basis of contemporary materials, objectively established facts and the apparent logic of events. This does not eliminate the established principles about witness credibility…

 

[142] In the recent decision of McGraddie v McGraddie and another [2013] UKSC 58; [2013] 1 WLR 2477, the UK Supreme Court emphasised that, especially in cases where a trial judge is faced with a stark choice between irreconcilable accounts, the credibility of the parties’ testimony, and the trial judge’s assessment of the character of witnesses and the manner in which the witnesses give evidence, is of primary importance. Those observations are particularly relevant to the present case. Similar observations have been made in Australian authorities (Fox v Percy at [23]; Rosenberg v Percival [2001] HCA 18; (2001) 205 CLR 434 at [41] per McHugh J and see generally comments in Ritchie’s Uniform Civil Procedure NSW at SCA s 75A.20).

 

[75] In Camden v McKenzie [2008] 1 Qd R 39 at [34] Keane JA (as he then was) made the observation that “the rational resolution of an issue involving the credibility of witnesses will require reference to, and analysis of, any evidence independent of the parties which is apt to cast light on the probabilities of the situation.” This remark was cited with approval by Leeming JA (with whom Barrett JA and Tobias AJA agreed) in New South Wales v Hunt (2014) 86 NSWLR 226 at [56].

 

[76] Hallen J recently set out the relevant principles in Evans and Braddock [2015] NSWSC 249 at [70]-[77]. After referring to Watson v Foxman, his Honour said:

 

[71] In that case, his Honour was talking of a cause of action founded on s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) or s 42 of theFair Trading Act 1987 (NSW): see the discussion by McDougall J in Harbour Port Consulting v NSW Maritime [2011] NSWSC 813, at [10] – [18]. However, as McLelland CJ in Eq also pointed out, the views apply to all types of litigation.

 

[72] I also remember what was said by Emmett J (as his Honour then was) in Warner v Hung, in the matter of Bellpac Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (In Liquidation) (No 2) [2011] FCA 1123; (2011) 297 ALR 56, at [48]:

 

“When proof of any fact is required, the Court must feel an actual persuasion of the occurrence or existence of that fact before it can be found. Mere mechanical comparison of probabilities, independent of any belief in reality, cannot justify the finding of a fact. Actual persuasion is achieved where the affirmative of an allegation is made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the Court. However, reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequences of the fact to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, and the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations that must affect whether the fact has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the Court. Reasonable satisfaction should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony or indirect inferences (see Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361-2).”

 

[73] The credibility of a witness and his, or her, veracity may also be tested by reference to the objective facts proved independently of the evidence given, in particular by reference to the documents in the case, by paying particular regard to his, or her, motives, and to the overall probabilities: Armagas Ltd v Mundogas S.A. (The “Ocean Frost”) [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1, per Robert Goff LJ, at 57. Also see, In the matter of Kit Digital Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) [2014] NSWSC 1547, per Black J, at [7].

 

[74] A court, in cases involving events which occurred long before the litigation, usually prefers to rely upon contemporaneous, or near contemporaneous, documents, which will often provide valuable and, usually, more revealing, information than what may be flawed attempts at recollection of those facts by persons with an interest in the outcome of the litigation: Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] FCA 1200, per Jagot J, at [1247]. Greater weight is usually accorded to such documents, as often they provide a safer repository of reliable fact, particularly when it is clear that they have been prepared by a person with no reason to misstate those facts in the documents and where there is no suggestion that the documents are other than genuine: Hughes v St Barbara Mines Ltd [No 4] [2010] WASC 160, per Kenneth Martin J, at[157].

 

[75]   …

 

[76] The circumstances of this case, make what was written by Tamberlin J in Lake Cumbeline Pty Ltd v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (trading as Uncle Ben’s of Australia) (Federal Court of Australia, Tamberlin J, 29 June 1995, unrep), at 122 – 123 (in a passage cited with approval by the High Court when it upheld his Honour’s decision: Effem Foods Pty Ltd v Lake Cumbeline Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 15; (1999) 161 ALR 599, at [15]) appropriate to remember:

 

“[Given the lapse of time] between the events and conversations raised in evidence and the hearing of the evidence before me, the only safe course is to place primary emphasis on the objective factual surrounding material and the inherent commercial probabilities, together with the documentation tendered in evidence. In circumstances where the events took place so long ago, it must be an exceptional witness whose undocumented testimony can be unreservedly relied on. The witnesses in this case unfortunately did not come within that exceptional class. The discussions referred to in evidence were capable of bearing quite opposed meanings depending on subtle differences of nuance and emphasis, and a proper appreciation of the significance of those matters must necessarily be considerably diminished over such a long period of time.”

 

[77]   Finally, I should mention an article by the former the Chief Judge at Common Law, P McClellan entitled “Who Is Telling the Truth? Psychology, Common Sense and the Law” (2006) 80 ALJ 655, in which he wrote, at 665, quoting a passage from the “Guidelines Relating to Recovered Memories” (2000) of the Australian Psychological Society:

 

“Memory is a constructive and reconstructive process. What is remembered about an event is shaped by how that event was experienced, by conditions prevailing during attempts to remember, and by events occurring between the experience and the attempted remembering. Memories can be altered, deleted and created by events that occur during and after the time of encoding, during the period of storage, and during any attempts at retrieval.”

Ultimately, His Honour formed the view that if the melanoma was present it was not discernible by the exercise of reasonable care on the part of the doctor.

Class Action – payment to the class rep ?

The scheme provides for payment to the class representative. For example, in Johnston v Endeavour Energy [2016] NSWSC 1132 it amounted to $25,000. This payment is intended to compensate the representative for their time, inconvenience and burden associated with taking on and discharging the obligations of lead plaintiff in attending to matters on behalf of group members.

The appropriateness of compensating class representatives was established in Darwalla Milling Co Pty Ltd v F Hoffman-La Roche & Ors Ltd (No 2) [2006] FCA 1388; 236 ALR 322 where Jessup J recognised that he was dealing with a then novel request for payment outside the normal categories allowed in litigation. His Honour held that it was:

“76 … prima facie reasonable that particular parties who have sacrificed valuable time and incurred expenses in the interests of prosecuting [a] proceeding on behalf of group members as a whole should be able to look to the corpus of the settlement sum for some degree of compensation and reimbursement. More importantly, perhaps, I would hold that group members who have benefited from the proceeding could not be heard to deny the reasonableness of such a proposition.”

The circumstances of the case dicate the quantum of payment. in Johnston v Endeavour Energy [2016] NSWSC 1132 there were 54 personal injury (PI) claims!

You be the judge. Was $25,000 fair. I suspect so.

Class Actions – lawyers costs – the proper approach

In Johnston v Endeavour Energy [2016] NSWSC 1132 Hoeben CJ summarised the proper approach to the task of evaluating the overall reasonableness of a proposed costs deduction from a class action settlement.

The applicable principles have recently been set out by Osborne JA in Matthews. In Courtney v Medtel Pty Limited (No 5) [2004] 212 ALR 311; FCA 1406 at [61] (Medtel) (Sackville J) described his expectation as to the content of the material to be provided to the Court:

“61   It is for the reasons I have given that I suggested to [the applicant] that evidence should be presented from an independent solicitor or costs consultant, directed to the following matters:

(i)    the reasonableness of the terms of the fee and retainer agreements (including the provisions for ancillary services, interest and an uplift factor);

(ii)    whether the fees and disbursements actually charged by the Solicitors have been calculated in accordance with the fee and retainer agreement;

(iii)    confirming that, so far as the solicitor or costs consultant can determine, no significant portion of the fees and disbursements charged by the Solicitors have been inappropriately or unnecessarily incurred in conducting the proceedings on behalf of Mr Courtney and the represented group.

I made it clear that I did not expect the evidence to involve an exhaustive review of the files maintained by the Solicitors. I had in mind an overview that could be undertaken over a period of about two days.”

Principles that govern an application for approval of a settlement of a group proceeding

In Johnston v Endeavour Energy [2016] NSWSC 1132 Hoeben CJ carefully identified the principles that govern an application for approval of a settlement of a group proceeding.

Confidential opinions of counsel are required to address each of the principles below.

These opinions are usually sealed and handed up to the judge.

The principles are summarised as follows:

  1. The central question for the Court is whether the proposed settlement is fair and reasonable in the interests of the group members as a whole (Rowe v AusNet Electricity Services Pty Ltd and Ors [2015] VSC 232 at [49] – [51]; Matthews v SPI Electricity and SPI Electricity Pty Ltd v Utility Services Corporation Ltd (Ruling No 16)[2013] VSC 74 (Matthews) at [34]; Wheelahan & Anor v City of Casey & Ors [2011] VSC 215 (Wheelahan) at [57] (EmertonJ) citing ACCC v Chats House Investments Pty Ltd & Ors [1996] 71 FCR 250; FCA 1119 at 258 (Branson J) (Chats House).
  2. There will rarely be one single or obvious way in which a settlement should be framed, either between group members and the defendants (inter partes aspects) or in relation to sharing the compensation among group members (inter se aspects) – reasonableness is a range and the question is whether the proposed settlement is within that range (Darwalla Milling Co Pty Ltd v F Hoffman-La Roche& Ors Ltd (No 2) [2006] FCA 1388; 236 ALR 322 at 336 [40] (Jessup J) (Darwalla).
  3. It is not the task of the Court to “second-guess” or go behind the tactical or other decisions made by the plaintiff’s legal representatives, but rather to satisfy itself that the decisions are within the range of reasonable decisions according to the known circumstances and the reasonably perceived risks of the litigation (Matthews, Darwalla, see also Pharm-a-Care Laboratories Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (No 6) [2011] FCA 277 at [22] (Flick J) (Pharma); Modtech Engineering Pty Ltd v GPT Management Holdings Ltd [2013] FCA 626 at [12] (Modtech) (Gordon J).
  4. In assessing the fairness and reasonableness of a proposed settlement the court relies heavily upon the candid, frank and confidential opinions provided to it by the plaintiff’s legal representatives requiring them to disclose the factors which were material to the decision to accept the settlement (Thomas v Powercor Australia Limited [2011] VSC 614 at [18] (Beach J) (Powercor); Wheelahan at [75]; Rod Investments (Vic) Pty Ltd v Abeyratne & Ors [2010] VSC 457 at [11] and [18] (Almond J) (Abeyratne); Lopez v Star World Enterprises Pty [1999] ATPR 41 – 678 at 42 – 670; [1999] FCA 104 (Finkelstein J) (Lopez).
  5. The factors adopted in Williams v FAI Home Security Pty Ltd (No 4) [2000] 180 ALR 459; [2000] FCA 1925 (Williams) indicate some of the considerations typically relevant to an assessment of an application for approval. As Goldberg J pointed out in Williams, this is a useful but not exhaustive guide. Those considerations are:
  6. (A)    The complexity and duration of the litigation.
  7. (B)   The reaction of the class to the settlement.
  8. (C)   The stage of the proceedings.
  9. (D)   The risks of establishing liability.
  10. (E)   The risks of establishing damages.
  11. (F)   The risks of maintaining a class action.
  12. (G)   The ability of the defendants to withstand a greater judgment.
  13. (H)   The range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of the best recovery; and
  14. (I)   The range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of all of the attendant risks of litigation.
  15. The factors in Williams are largely directed to the reasonableness of a compromise inter partes. They are, however, also relevant to a consideration of the agreements reached with the insurance intervenors. The procedure should likewise be fair and reasonable “inter se”.
  16. An important consideration is whether group members were given timely notice of the critical elements so that they had an opportunity to take steps to protect their own position if they wished. Once appropriate notice is given, the absence of objections or other response action from group members is a relevant consideration in support of the settlement and all its elements (Dorajay Pty Ltd v Aristocrat Leisure Ltd [2009] FCA 19 (Stone J) (Aristocrat); Abeyratne at [22]; Horshamat [15], [25).
  17. Where a group member objects to the settlement, an important question is whether the objector is prepared to assume the role and risks of being lead plaintiff. It is easy for group members who face no adverse costs risk to want a plaintiff to fight to the very end. The weight to be given to objections will diminish where the objector is unwilling or unable to take on all of the economic and other burdens which the plaintiff otherwise bears (Wong v Silkfield [2000] FCA 1421 at[24] – [30] (Spender J)).
  1. The effect of those considerations is that the proposed settlement must be fair and reasonable and in the interests of all group members who will be bound by the settlement. In this context group members, who are not clients of Maddens, are not directly represented. It is their interests in particular which the Court, in an application of the present kind, is concerned to ensure are addressed fairly, vis-a-vis the plaintiff and other group members and having regard to the overall merits of the claims made on their behalf in the action.
  2. Notwithstanding the reservations expressed by Jessup J in Darwalla regarding lists of criteria, the factors identified by Goldberg J in Williams as typically bearing on an assessment of a proposed settlement provide a useful framework. Those factors are:
  1. The amount offered to each group member.
  2. The prospects of success in the proceeding.
  3. The likelihood of the group members obtaining judgment for an amount significantly in excess of the settlement offer.
  4. The terms of advice received from counsel and from any independent expert in relation to the issues which arise in the proceeding.
  5. The likely duration and cost of the proceeding if continued to judgment.
  6. The attitude of group members to the settlement.

Nature of a deposit

A “deposit” is usually paid at the time of making a contract and has been described as “an earnest to bind the bargain” the subject of the contract. It is a payment that is made before the delivery of the item or property the subject of the contract.

As Lord Justice Cotton says in Howe v. Smith[44], at page 95:—

The deposit, as I understand it, and using the words of Lord Justice James, is a guarantee that the contract shall be performed. If the sale goes on, of course, not only in accordance with the words of the contract, but in accordance with the intention of the parties in making the contract, it goes in part payment of the purchase-money for which it is deposited; but if on the default of the purchaser the contract goes off, that is to say, if he repudiates the contract, then according to Lord Justice James, he can have no right to recover the deposit.
I do not say that in all cases where this court would refuse specific performance, the vendor ought to be entitled to retain the deposit. It may well be that there may be circumstances which would justify this court in declining, and which would require the court, according to its ordinary rules, to refuse to order specific performance, in which it could not be said that the purchaser had repudiated the contract, or that he had entirely put an end to it so as to enable the vendor to retain the deposit. In order to enable the vendor so to act, in my opinion there must be acts on the part of the purchaser which not only amount to delay sufficient to deprive him of the equitable remedy of specific performance but which would make his conduct amount to a repudiation on his part of the contract.

In the same case, Fry L. J., said:—

Money paid as a deposit must, I conceive, be paid on some terms implied or expressed. In this case no terms are expressed, and we must, therefore, inquire what terms are to be implied. The terms most naturally to be implied appear to me in the case of money paid on the signing of a contract to be that in the event of the contract being performed it shall be brought into account, but if the contract is not performed by the payer it shall remain the property of the payee. It is not merely a part payment, but is then also an earnest to bind the bargain so entered into, and creates by the fear of its forfeiture a motive in the payer to perform the rest of the contract.

In layman’s terms it can also be considered a bond for performance, indicating a sincere intention to be bound, which is forfeited if the party breaches the contract.

The common law relating to deposits in a contract for the sale of land is to the following effect.

First, a label or description in a contract of a payment as a ‘deposit’ is not determinative of its character as such: Coates v Sarich (1964) WAR 2, 15; Freedom v AHR Constructions Pty Ltd [1987] 1 Qd R 59, 66.

Second, a deposit fulfils two functions; first, its primary function is an earnest given by the purchaser to bind the bargain and to provide security for its performance; second, it is also a part payment of the purchase price: Howe v Smith (1884) 27 Ch D 89 ; Brien v Dwyer [1978] HCA 50; (1978) 141 CLR 378.

Third, on termination of a contract for breach, at common law the deposit paid by the purchaser is forfeited to the vendor: Brien v Dwyer; Romanos v Pentagold Investments Pty Ltd [2003] HCA 58; (2003) 217 CLR 367; Commissioner of Taxation v Reliance Carpet Co Pty Ltd [2008] HCA 22; (2008) 236 CLR 342. The vendor has an unconditional right to retain the deposit paid by the purchaser because the consideration has not failed. Wickham J in Farrant v Leburn (1970) WAR 179 explained:

The agreement to pay [the deposit] was not in consideration of conveyance but was in consideration of the contract. It was the price or part of the price of the vendor’s promise to sell and this promise, having been given by the vendor, the consideration for the purchaser’s promise was fully executed (184).

This explanation of a deposit at common law resonates with the words deleted from the definition of ‘terms contract’ in the Bill. In Farrant, the vendor had rescinded the contract for the purchaser’s ‘fundamental breach’ in failing to pay a deposit which was payable immediately on entry into the contract.

Further, the vendor can recover any unpaid deposit that has accrued due prior to contractual termination: Bot v Ristevski [1981] VicRp 13; [1981] VR 120. By contrast, on termination for breach, an instalment of the purchase price belongs to the purchaser at common law on the basis that the consideration for the payment, being the conveyance or transfer of the land, has failed and thus the instalment can be recovered, subject to the vendor’s right to counterclaim for damages: McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd [1933] HCA 25; (1933) 48 CLR 457.

Fourth, the payment of a deposit within the contractual time stipulation is deemed, at law and in equity, to be an essential term of the contract (Brien v Dwyer) with the consequence that any breach of any nature or degree justifies termination without notice: Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council v Sampine Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 61; (2007) 233 CLR 115 [48]. Repudiation is a separate and independent ground for summary termination at common law: Koompahtoo [44].

Most of the cases on the subject of deposits to which I have referred concerned deposits which were payable on or around the time of entry into the contract. That accords with the common understanding of a deposit as an upfront payment as an earnest of the purchaser’s intention to perform and as security for the vendor. A bird in the hand, as they say. Gibbs J stated in Brien v Dwyer that the primary purpose of the deposit would not be served unless the deposit were paid at the very time when the purchaser assumed his obligations under the contract (392). This is reflected in the standard form offer and acceptance. The notion of a purchaser’s mere unperformed promise to pay a deposit being the earnest of performance and the security is inconsistent with long established principle. A promise to pay a deposit that survives termination is in substance a liquidated damages clause.

However, it must be accepted that in appropriate circumstances a deposit can be paid by instalments over an extended period: Romanos v Pentagold Investments Pty Ltd. In that case, the majority (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne & Heydon JJ) stated:

In Brien, Jacobs J described a deposit as:

[A]n assurance to the vendor, a security to him pending completion. He can take his property off the market and not concern himself with other offers in case the sale should go off, with the comfort at least that the deposit is there for his security’.
This reasoning is no less applicable to contracts providing for the payment of a deposit in particular instalments at times each stated to be essential. That is the present case. Further, Brien is authority for the proposition that once there has arisen an entitlement to rescind for failure to pay the deposit, that entitlement may be exercised without the necessity that the purchaser first be given notice requiring payment to be made at a reasonable time [20].

How can a deposit be characterised from a something like a part payment?

In Howe v Smith (1884) 27 Ch D 89 Fry LJ said at 101:

Money paid as a deposit must, I conceive, be paid on some terms implied or expressed. In this case no terms are expressed, and we must therefore inquire what terms are to be implied. The terms most naturally to be implied appear to me in the case of money paid on the signing of a contract to be that in the event of the contract being performed it shall be brought into account, but if the contract is not performed by the payer it shall remain the property of the payee. It is not merely a part payment, but is then also an earnest to bind the bargain so entered into, and creates by the fear of its forfeiture motive in the payer to perform the rest of the contract.

In Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Reliance Carpet Co Pty Ltd [2008] HCA 22; (2008) 236 CLR 342 the High Court said at 351-352 [27] (footnotes omitted):

The expression “an earnest to bind the bargain” reflects, as Fry LJ put it in Howe v Smith, the adaptation by the common law of “[t]he practice of giving something to signify the conclusion of the contract, sometimes a sum of money, sometimes a ring or other object, to be repaid or redelivered on the completion of the contract, [which] appears to be one of great antiquity and very general prevalence”. The practice was received from Roman law into the mediaeval common law by the time of Bracton, and thus preceded the development of the modern law of contract and of the equitable principles which it includes. The quotation by Fry LJ from Bracton indicates that where something was given by way of a deposit before delivery then if the buyer repented and wished to resile from the contract the buyer lost the deposit; if the seller was responsible for the non-performance then the seller was required to return double the amount of the deposit. Writing in the same period as Fry LJ, Benjamin said that in the modern law “the true legal effect of earnest is simply to afford conclusive evidence that a bargain was actually completed with mutual intention that it should be binding on both [parties]”.

Product liability

Source: www.fasterway.com.au

This is a typical fracture surface. This is a threaded connection (hence the appearance of a depression around the circumference).

The fracture surface was smooth, flat, and perpendicular to the principal axis of the bolt. Crack progression marks (beach marks) extended radially from one side of the bolt and covered approximately 90% of the fracture surface area. The remaining small region towards the outer edge of the bolt exhibited features consistent with an overstress failure. The large area of fatigue cracking and small overstress area indicated that failure of the bolt was due to high cycle low stress fatigue cracking.

Bolt fracture surface showing evidence of fatigue crack progression (beach) marks

Bolt fracture surface showing evidence of fatigue crack progression (beach) marks

Source: ATSB

On 30 May 2015, a Fasterway powered parachute, recreational registration 19-7677, collided with terrain near Theodore, Queensland. The pilot, the sole occupant, died as a result of the accident.

Submitted eyenut and fractured bolt

Source: ATSB – Investigation title: Technical assistance to Recreational Aviation Australia in the examination of a fractured eyebolt from the collision with terrain involving a Fasterway Powered Parachute, near Theodore, Qld. on 30 May 2015

Investigation number: AE-2015-075

Strike out considerations – echoes from an appeal

To summarily to dispose of the proceedings is one which calls for the exercise of “exceptional caution”. [1]

The power cannot be exercised “once it appears that there is a real question to be determined whether of fact or law and that the rights of the parties depend upon it.” [2]

It is only to be exercised “when the action is clearly without foundation and … to allow it to proceed would impose a hardship upon the defendants which may be avoided without risk of injustice to the plaintiff”. [3]

The “Court is not concluded by the manner in which the litigant formulates his case in his pleadings.” [4]

The fatal defects in the plaintiff’s case must be very clear before the Court will intervene to strike out a pleading. [5]

A “high degree of certainty” that the plaintiff’s case will fail if it goes to trial is required. [6]

References

1.General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69; (1964) 112 CLR 125 (at 129) per Barwick CJ.

2. Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1949] HCA 1; (1949) 78 CLR 62 (at 91) per Dixon J.

3. Cox v Journeaux (No 2) [1935] HCA 48; (1935) 52 CLR 713 (at 720) per Dixon J.

4. Ibid.

5. Shaw v State of New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 102 (at [30]ff) per Barrett JA (Beazley, McColl, Macfarlan JJA and McClellan CJ at CL agreeing); Brimson v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 937 (at 944 – 945) per Cross J.

6. Agar v Hyde [2000] HCA 41; (2000) 201 CLR 552 (at [57]) per Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ.

 

Taken from [6] of Perera v Genworth Financial Mortgage Insurance Pty Limited [2016] NSWCA 53 (Slattery J)

Interrogatories in medical negligence

Principles set out in [6]-[13] Rice v Ghabrial [2016] NSWSC 313

The issue of interrogatories is governed by the rules and generally requires that the interrogatories be “necessary”. In the case of personal injury matters, the rules also require that there be “special reasons” for the administering of the interrogatories.

These matters were dealt with by the Court, as presently constituted in Chong v Nguyen [2005] NSWSC 588. In Chong, the Court said:

“12 There has been some debate about the requirement for the question to be ‘necessary’. Most often reference is made to Boyle v Downs [1979] 1 NSWLR 192 at 204-5. The Court (Cross J) there confirmed that the word ‘necessary’ was to be interpreted as meaning ‘necessary for a fair trial’.

His Honour said:

‘In considering the meaning of the word “necessary” in Part 23 Rule 14 – a rule relating to discovery and inspection similar to Rule 5 in Part 24 relating to interrogatories – Rath J in Percy v General Motors-Holden’s Pty Ltd [1975] 1 NSWLR 289 interpreted it as “necessary in the interests of a fair trial”. This definition is similar to the one I have suggested; for in Griebart v Morris [1920] 1 KB 659, Scrutton LJ interpreted “necessary for disposing fairly of the cause or matter” (under the English rules relating to interrogatories) as “necessary for the fair trial of the action”.’

13 The Court of Appeal has referred with authority to that passage in Schutt v Queenan [2000] NSWCA 341 at [11], [12], [13], [14] and [15]. His Honour the President said:

‘The answers which are sought are material in the sense that they may enable the claimant either to maintain her own case or to destroy the case put against her’ (see Griebart v Morris [1920] 1 KB 659 at 664).

14 While other views have been expressed at various levels of the judicial hierarchy, the overwhelming authoritative view is that the Court must be satisfied that the order is ‘necessary in the interests of a fair trial’.

15 It is, in this case, essential in light of the arguments pressed, to examine the meaning of the word ‘necessary’ in that context.

16 The word ‘necessary’ when used in relation to a requirement on the exercise of a power granted to a court should generally and does here mean ‘reasonably required or legally ancillary’ to the achievement of the goal, in this case, of a fair trial. I refer to the joint judgment of Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ in Pelechowski v Registrar, Court of Appeal (1999) 198 CLR 435 which, while determining whether there was a valid basis for contempt proceedings, examined the power of the District Court to issue injunctive relief. They said:

‘The term “necessary” in such a setting as this is to be understood in the sense given it by Pollock CB in Attorney-General v Walker (1849) 3 Ex 242, namely as identifying a power to make orders which are reasonably required or legally ancillary to the accomplishment of the specific remedies for enforcement provided in Division 4 of Part 3 of the District Court Act. In this setting, the term “necessary” does not have the meaning of “essential”; rather it is to be “subjected to the touchstone of reasonableness” (State Drug Crime Commission of NSW v Chapman (1987) 12 NSWLR 477 at 452).’ (my emphasis)”

Thus, in the context of UCPR r 22.1, the plaintiff must satisfy the Court that interrogatories are “reasonably required or legally ancillary” to the achievement of the goal, in this case, of a fair trial. In that sense, the word “necessary” in the relevant rule of the Court does not require that the order is “essential”.

Further, by operation of UCPR r 22.1(3), the Court is not to make such an order unless it is satisfied that “special reasons exist that justify the making of the order”.

A purposive construction of the above rule should be given. The purpose of requiring the Court to be satisfied of “special reasons” is to ensure that interrogatories in personal injury matters are not the ordinary course and to restrict the circumstances in which a Court will order interrogatories. As explained by Hall J in Keating v South East Sydney Illawarra Area Health Service (Supreme Court (NSW), Hall J, 7 July 2006, unrep at [24]-[25]), one relevant but not necessarily determinative criterion is the availability of the evidence otherwise.

The term “special” has been defined in a number of ways. The Macquarie Dictionary defines the term as “relating or peculiar to a particular person, thing, instance; having a particular function, purpose, of a distinct or particular character; being a particular one; extraordinary or exceptional”. In a somewhat circular fashion the aforesaid dictionary defines “exceptional” as “special” and the Oxford English Dictionary defines the term “exceptional” as “of the nature of or forming an exception; out of the ordinary course; unusual, special”.

It would seem on the basis of the foregoing and given the context in which the Court is required to be satisfied of special reasons, the UCPR provide that the Court must be satisfied that the basis for the issue of the interrogatories is unusual or out of the ordinary in the context of the class of personal injury actions.

I approach the exercise of my discretion with that test in mind and in the context of the provisions of s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 and following, namely, the achievement of an outcome that facilitates the quick, cheap and just resolution of the real issues in dispute between the parties.

How a quantum meruit claim is to be established

Jason and Michelle Zammit trading as Zammit’s Quality Constructions v Saul Markunsky and Shereen Markunsky [2015] NSWCATCD 21 at [47],[48]

At [47] – Judgement of Bryne J. in Brenner v First Artists’ Management Pty Ltd [1993] 2 VR 221 as summarised in Dorter & Sharkey Building and Construction Contracts in Australia, Second Edition as setting out the following principles:

1.‘The courts task is not to assess damages for breach of contract, but to ascertain what is fair and reasonable compensation for the benefit of the services performed, and accepted actually or constructively by the recipient;

2.The enquiry is not primarily directed to the cost to the plaintiff of performing the work since the law is not compensating that party for loss suffered; however, the actual cost should not be ignored;

3.Any price or commission agreed between the parties may be received as evidence of the value the parties themselves put on the services performed, even where the services have not been totally performed, but the agreed amount is not determinative of the matter.’

At [48] – Principles relevant to how a quantum meruit is assessed were also discussed by Barrett J in Eddy Lau Constructions Pty Ltd v Transdevelopment Enterprise Pty Ltd.

At [70] – paragraph 82 of Barratt J’s decision in Eddy Lau Constructions Pty Ltd v Transdevelopment Enterprise Pty Ltd justifies an approach where defective work is taken into account in the assessment of a quantum meruit claim. His honour stated:

‘The quality of the work and matters such as its correspondence with specification and fitness for its intended purpose are thus elements of the process of valuation of work for quantum meruit purposes. It follows that the referee was correct in applying a deduction for defects rectification in determining the quantum meruit sum.’

Recovery on a quantum meruit

Jason and Michelle Zammit trading as Zammit’s Quality Constructions v Saul Markunsky and Shereen Markunsky [2015] NSWCATCD 21

 

 

Section 92 (2) of the Home Building Act states as follows:

‘A person must not demand or receive a payment under a contract for residential building work (whether as a deposit or other payment and whether or not work under the contract has commenced) from any other party to the contract unless:

(a)  a contract of insurance that complies with this Act is in force in relation to that work in the name of the person who contracted to do the work, and

(b)  a certificate of insurance evidencing the contract of insurance, in a form prescribed by the regulations, has been provided to the other party (or one of the other parties) to the contract.’

Section 94(1) of the Act states as follows:

‘(1) If a contract of insurance required by section 92 is not in force, in the name of the person who contracted to do the work, in relation to any residential building work done under a contract (the uninsured work), the contractor who did the work:

(a)  is not entitled to damages, or to enforce any other remedy in respect of a breach of the contract committed by any other party to the contract, in relation to that work, and

(b)  is not entitled to recover money in respect of that work under any other right of action (including a quantum meruit).’

Section 94(1A) of the Act states as follows in connection with the above sections:

‘(1A) Despite section 92 (2) and subsection (1), if a court or tribunal considers it just and equitable, the contractor, despite the absence of the required contract of insurance, is entitled to recover money in respect of that work on a quantum meruit basis.’

The effect of the above sections is that builder are not entitled to recover on their claim for money due under the contracts they allege were entered into with owners. Further, builders will not be entitled to recover on a quantum meruit for the work they allege that they have carried out for owners and not been paid for unless recovery be deemed just and equitable.

Section 94(1A) of the Act was considered by Barrett J in Eddy Lau Constructions Pty Ltd v Transdevelopment Enterprise Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 273. At paragraphs 43 – 61 of his judgement his honour considered the ‘just and equitable criterion under section 94(1A)’ of the Act and the factors bearing upon the just and equitable assessment.

In considering the just and equitable criterion Barrett J. referred to a number of authorities which establish that the words just and equitable are of wide significance. His honour referred to a passage of the judgement of Sheller JA in Stephenson v State Bank of NewSouth Wales (1996) 39 NSWLR 101 where his honour quoted from a decision of the High Court in Talga v MBC International Limited(1976) 133 CLR 622.

The passage quoted was:

‘Stephen, Mason and Jacobs JJ dealing with the issue raised for the Court by the Banking Act 1974 of whether it was just and equitable that a transaction should be treated as valid, said: ‘The court will have before it an existing transaction replete with all its surrounding facts and circumstances and in their light will determine what is just and equitable. In doing so it will certainly be exercising a wide discretion that this is a commonplace of the curial process; the court will be bound to act judicially, exercising its discretion by reference only to such considerations affecting the transaction as, on an examination of the legislation, may be seen to be material to the decision which it is called on to make. Irrelevant matters, matters such as the plaintiffs instanced in the course of argument, which have no rational connection with the policy of the regulations but would be expressive only of the personal predilections of the Court, cannot be allowed by it to play any part in its decision.’

Barrett J. observed that this approach was endorsed by Campbell J in Sullman v Sullman [2002] NSWSC 169.

At paragraph 49 of his judgement Barrett J. stated in connection with section 94(1A) of the Act:

‘The inquiry directed by the statute is therefore, in effect, whether the surrounding circumstances are such as to justify the creation of a right and an obligation as to the payment of the sum separately determined to represent fair remuneration. The Act, as I see it, does not attempt to control quantification. That is left to the general principle imported by the expression “quantum meruit”. The Act is concerned with factors influencing a decision whether, in the particular circumstances in which the court finds the parties, it is fair that one receive the quantum meruit sum and the other pay it.’

Decision of Hall J in Pender v Robwenphi Pty Limited & Anor [2008] NSWSC 1144. In that case Hall J stated, commencing at paragraph 41, in connection with the decision of Barrett J in Eddy Lau Constructions Pty Ltd vTransdevelopment Enterprise Pty Ltd:

‘In relation to the analysis undertaken by Barrett J in Eddy Lau Constructions (supra), the following propositions may be derived from the judgment:-

(1) The words “just and equitable” are of the widest significance and involve evaluations of questions of fact.

(2) In exercising the wide discretion under the provision, a Court or Tribunal is to have regard to considerations affecting the particular transaction as are material to the decision to be made. Irrelevant matters are those that have no rational connection with the policy of the statutory requirement.

(3) The statutory discretion under s.94(1A) must be exercised judicially in light of the whole of the circumstances surrounding the relevant subject matter.

(4) Inquiry is directed to ascertaining whether the surrounding circumstances are such as to justify the creation of a right and an obligation as to the payment of the sum separately determined to represent fair remuneration.

(5) The Act is concerned with factors influencing a decision whether, in the particular circumstances in which the Court finds the parties, it is fair that one receive the quantum meruit sum and the other pay it.

It is apparent from the analysis by Barrett J in Eddy Lau Constructions (supra) that the conduct of the party in breach is an important matter for consideration. In that respect, ignorance or oversight of the statutory requirement under the Act stands in marked contrast to a contravention that is wilful or deliberate.

In the present case, the determination of the Tribunal was, in effect, that the first defendant’s contravention was an inadvertent one, it being a company accustomed to undertaking commercial and industrial work and not home building or renovation work. The Tribunal accepted, as it was entitled to, the evidence given which explained the first defendant’s ignorance or inadvertence. These were matters of fact for the Tribunal’s determination.

In the circumstances of the present matter, on the evidence there was no identification of any particular form of disqualifying conduct by or on behalf of the first defendant that was material to be taken into account in determining what was “just and equitable”.

The Tribunal was also entitled to have regard, as Barrett J did in Eddy LauConstructions (supra) to the fact that, if the first defendant was not granted relief under s.94(1A), the plaintiff would receive the benefit of the work undertaken by the first defendant without having to pay for that work and for the materials supplied. I will return to this issue of “benefit” below.

Finally, there was no factor establish(ed) that resulted in any detriment flowing to the plaintiff by reason of the particular breaches or contraventions by the first defendant. Again, such matters involve a factual determination for the Tribunal.’